Saturday, July 11, 2009

Chris Pronger Contract - Brilliance or Folly?

It is sometimes stunning what kind of errors can be made by NHL front offices. In 2001, the New Jersey Devils forgot to send contracts to Brian Rafalski and John Madden, making them both unrestricted free agents. This off-season, the Blackhawks sent qualifying offers through the mail to several key players, a violation of protocol that forced their hand into signing both Kris Versteeg and Cam Barker to long-term contracts. That stupidity was followed up by perhaps a greater one, as we'll see.

Chris Pronger signed a 7 year, 35 million dollar extension with the Philadelphia Flyers this past week. At first, we thought this typical grand guignol Flyers behavior - the horror show put on the ice by Pronger would soon rival the horror show off the ice as Chris Pronger and his contract aged. A famous clause in the CBA, 50.2.a.iv, states the following: 'All Player Salary and Bonuses earned in a League Year by a Player who is in the second or later year of a multi-year SPC which was signed when the player was 35 or older (as of June 30 prior to the League Year in which the SPC is to be effective), regardless of whether, or where, the player is playing...'. Lou Lamoriello was famously forced to give up a 1st round draft pick to move Vladimir Malakhov's dead money off his cap. Chris Pronger is right now 34 years of age, but he turns 35 on October 10th, therefore this clause is invoked, as the contract he signed does not go into effect until July 1, 2010.

However, as we looked at with the Detroit Red Wings a few whiffens past, the Flyers frontloaded this deal. The contract is structured such that Pronger gets paid (in millions) - 7.6, 7.6, 7.2, 7, 4, .525, .525. Essentially, he's going to play for the Flyers for five years, and then he's going to be a burden on the Flyers' salary cap for 2 seasons, costing them 5 million dollars to not play for them. Dumb, typical Flyers move, like signing a 92 year old Kjell Samuelsson type stuff - just no appreciation for the future.

Then, we reconsidered. Imagine this scenario - Chris Pronger is 40 years old, his wife tires of the Pat's vs. Geno's debate, he begins to have remorse about everyone he's maimed, and so he 'retires' - then the Flyers trade his cap hit to some team in the year 2015. While we cannot predict what the economic climate of the US and Canada will be that far in advance, we can predict that somewhere, some NHL owner will have gotten himself in too deep in buying a franchise, and will be desperate to cut costs somewhere. Enter Chris Pronger's contract - it counts for $5 million on the cap, but Pronger won't have to be paid a red cent. It's the perfect asset for a perpetually broke team struggling to reach the salary floor, which is set around $39 million this season, and will likely be closer to $45 million 5 years hence. Therefore, the Flyers win in two ways - one, Pronger's cap hit is lower than it would be for a player making $7 million, and two, they get to fob off this Pronger contract as a legitimate asset once his playing career is over. It's brilliant and forward-thinking.

The next day, we learn this:

"According to the NHL, the [Pronger contract will count against the cap regardless of whether he retires]. The seven-year, $35 million extension Pronger agreed to on Tuesday doesn't commence until after June 30, 2010. Pronger will be 35 at that point and any remaining salary will remain on the cap.

The Flyers disagree and interpret the CBA language governing the "over 35" clause differently."

There's no other possible way to interpret that language than how it is interpreted above. If Slavoj Zizek, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Saul Kripke sat around in a room debating that passage, they'd come up with the same meaning. In other words, the Flyers goofed - they forgot that it didn't matter when the player was signed, it mattered when his contract went into effect. This rule was to put in place to safeguard against this very scenario - a team signing an aging player for a front-loaded contract with years on it that neither side intended on honoring. Now it looks like the Flyers, rather than anticipating Pronger being an asset, anticipate him being a liability, and it may cost them a valued asset to expunge this error.

The lesson is: do not overestimate people's capacity for creativity and reasonable thinking. A lot of times what looks like an oversight is in fact an oversight. We like imagining the look on Holmgren's face as some obscure bean counter situation in the lowest dungeon of the Wachovia Center unfurls the parchment upon which the CBA is inscribed to the relevant passage, both eager to impress the great Overlord and afraid of the result as he reads aloud 50.2.a.iv. That scene surely beats the one we are trying to forestall ourselves from imagining - Chris Pronger holding the Stanley Cup as a member of the Philadelphia Flyers.

Friday, July 10, 2009

A Note On Expected Goals

Expected Goals has popped up around here lately - it's something devised in-house and can be brutally wrong, but it gives at least a guideline of what to expect of new players on new teams.

Expected Goals is basically:

(Expected Shooting Percentage) * (Expected Shots On Goal)

Expected Shooting Percentage is (Average Shooting Percentage Since Lockout) * (% Difference Between Shooting Percentage Of Old Team and New Team in 2008-09 Season)

Expected Shots on Goal is (Average SOG/Game Since Lockout) * (% Difference Between Shots On Goal of Old Team and New Team in 2008-09 Season) * (% Increase/Decrease Expected As A Result of Aging)

There's lots of adjustments that can and should be made here, but they are quite difficult - they include time on ice adjustments, power play time on ice adjustments, power play strength adjustments, penalty killing time on ice adjustments, strength of expected linemates, and so forth; not adjusting for these things likely skews things between 1-3 goals either way (but could vary things as much as 5-10 goals in extreme cases). Regardless, it's a reasonable ballpark metric, and is certainly more instructional than looking simply at the past.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Anatomy of an RFA Contract - C Dave Bolland

It can be quite frustrating for a more passionate observer when less-informed fans discuss NHL contracts. This is no slight on the less informed - it is no surprise that they are either not interested or unaware of the minutiae of NHL contracts, because rarely do articles about the NHL speak in this fashion - this sort of analysis is too often absent. Regardless, when discussing an RFA contract, one should ask three relevant questions - then a follow-up:

1: Was the player arbitration-eligible?

2: How many (if any) UFA years did the contract signed extend through?

3: What are comparable RFA players around the league making?

Obviously, the second question should be asked much less awkwardly than it is asked here. Let us examine the contract of Dave Bolland, who signed for 16.875 million dollars over five years with the Blackhawks.

Was the player arbitration eligible?

Answer: No. Bolland signed an entry-level contract in 2007 age the age of 19 (or 20), and had 3 years of pro experience - a player who signs an entry-level contract between the ages of 18 and 20 needs to have 4 years of pro experience before opting for arbitration.

We ask this question because arbitration allows for a player to be paid more - players without arbitration eligibility essentially have no bargaining power. Their only recourse is to sign an offer sheet with another team (or in another league) - otherwise, it is basically 'take it or leave it' from their team's GM.

How many UFA years does this contract extend through?

Answer: One. Assuming UFA rules stay the same after the next CBA is signed, Bolland would have been eligible to be unrestricted in July 2013 - this contract extends through July 2014.

We ask this question because RFA players are cheaper than UFA players - signing a player through UFA years keeps his price down.

What are comparable players around the league making?

Answer: This is more difficult to say. Jordan Staal's contract no doubt had a hand in this - Staal is making $4M/season until 2013. Joe Pavelski signed a 2 year, 3.275 million dollar deal as a non-arbitration eligible player in 2008 - his next contract will likely pay him between 3.5 and 4.5 million dollars a season.

The fourth question is one that shouldn't necessarily be germane but becomes so:

Will the player get better during the course of the contract?

Answer: The Blackhawks have to hope so, and are certainly counting on it. Bolland had 1.37 Shots On Goal Per Game (hereafter S/G) last season - if he continues that rate, he is unlikely to score more than 20 goals a season. The good news for the Hawks is that Bolland did not receive much power play time - if he does next season, expect his S/G and goals to rise. The Hawks have to be hoping his S/G rises to around 2 - around 2, and Bolland should be expected to score between 16 and 24 goals a season in a normal year, and closer to 30 in an abnormal year (like this past one). Bolland already appears to be an excellent assist man, as he averages close to 1 every 3 games, so his normal season may look like 20 goals and 30 assists, an excellent output for a third line center.

Did the Hawks make a good deal?

Answer: Almost certainly not. They ate up 3 arbitration-eligible years, a UFA year, and an arbitration-ineligible year. They must have very high hopes indeed and worry that a 60 point season for Bolland would mean a favorable comparison to a contract like Jordan Staal's. But with a career S/G of 1.33 so far, it is unlikely that Bolland has such a large offensive output. It is hard to predict what the NHL landscape will look like in July 2014 when Bolland is an unrestricted free agent, but it's hard to imagine him getting offers well above $5 million per season if he ever makes it there, so basically all the money saved in season 5 of the deal (by paying RFA instead of UFA prices) equals the money squandered in season 1 by signing him to this long-term deal. The Hawks would likely have been better served to try to sign Bolland to a deal not unlike that of Joe Pavelski's - there's not enough NHL information to conclude that Bolland will certainly be with 3.375M per season, and with the Hawks being in enormous salary cap trouble in 2010-11, Bolland may be first on the chopping block if he does not produce.

Monday, July 6, 2009

State of The Blog Address 2

After doing some thinking on the matter, I've decided to reconsider breaking down 100+ signings. I feel it would be repetitive and therefore ultimately not that interesting. Rather than shove out content, assembly-line style, I think there should be more of a focus on asking questions that I'm not sure I have the answer to, instead of pretending I have the answers to things which I don't.

Therefore, I will be going piecemeal around the league, dipping into RFAs, UFAs, and basically whatever strikes my fancy.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

The Scott Gomez Trade - Acquiring a True Anchorage

Montreal Acquires:

C Scott Gomez
LW Tom Pyatt
D Michael Busto

The New York Rangers Acquire:

LW/C Chris Higgins
D Pavel Valentenko
D Ryan McDonagh
D Doug Janik

Montreal's Take

C Scott Gomez

Age: 29 (30 in December)
Contract Status: Signed through 2013/14
Cap Hit: $7.357 M
Expected Goals: 18
Discipline: Low (T-9th among C with 30 Minors)
Physicality: Medium-Low

Scott Gomez's Corsi number is insanely high, likely one of the highest in the league at 323. The reason for this is simple - Gomez is not a traditional 'passer'. Looking around the league at players like Doug Weight and Adam Oates, they tended to average around 2 to 2.5 shots per game. Gomez is averaging 3+ post-lockout - last season Gomez was 16th in the league in shots on goal, 4th among centers. The downside is that many of Gomez's shots are very low-percentage shots or are attempts for his wingers to score on rebounds off his shots. Gomez therefore needs a very specific sort of player to play with him - he is far removed from his days of setting up Alexander Mogilny off one-timers at the top of the slot. With Montreal acquiring Mike Cammalleri and Brian Gionta for his wings, these players are well-suited to helping Gomez - Gionta was on Gomez's wing for 3 of his best seasons. Gomez may return to being a 20 goal 50 point type of player.

LW Tom Pyatt/D Michael Busto

Both are minor league depth - Busto played in the ECHL this season, and Pyatt had 37 points in the AHL as a 21/22 year old. Pyatt may have an NHL future, but it's unlikely that it's any more than as a depth winger.

The Rangers' Take

LW/C Chris Higgins

Age: 26 (27 next June)
Contract Status: Unsigned RFA, UFA in July 2010
Cap Hit: N/A
Expected Goals: 27
Discipline: High
Physicality: Medium-High

Higgins had by far the lowest shooting percentage of his career - his shooting percentage has dropped each year since the lockout. It's therefore a tad presumptuous to have his expected goals at 27; an adjustment may have to be made to Expected Goals for it to have any explanatory power. Higgins had little worth to the Habs if he was going to take them to arbitration - he's UFA in a year, and an arbitration price offers a small discount on what a free agent might cost.

D Ryan McDonagh

Age: 20
Contract Status: None; Still in NCAA

McDonagh was considered one of the Habs' top prospects, but he was 4th on his college team in scoring by defensemen - his strength must therefore be defense. Besides defensemen of the Paul Martin ilk who excel quietly at defense, we are prone to presuming that players cannot excel substantially at defense without also being at least competent at offense, especially at the amateur level.

D Pavel Valentenko

Age: 21 (22 in October)
Contract Status: Questionable

'Questionable' is written above because Valentenko defected from his AHL team and joined up with a KHL squad. It's unclear whether Valentenko intends to return to North America.

D Doug Janik

Age: 29 (30 next March)
Contract Status: UFA

We have no idea why Doug Janik was included in this deal - he was traded a day before the Rangers would lose his rights. Janik is a 7th/8th defensemen who could prove adequate for a team looking to save money.

Salary Cap Motivations

Scott Gomez's contract was one of the worst in the NHL when it was signed and that continues today - he has a 7.327 million dollar cap hit and has only scored more than 20 goals once. However, this free agent market is a terrible one for centers, and the Habs' top two centers for much of the season were UFA. The Habs therefore had several Faustian bargains at their disposal - either re-sign Saku Koivu, who is aged and cannot really carry a line at this point, or try to acquire a center, the owner of said center being likely not disposed to get rid of him. It's possible that the Habs knocked on Tampa's door and asked for Vincent Lecavalier - it's possible they knocked on Philly's door and asked for Daniel Briere. The Habs' one asset was salary cap room - they had almost 28 million dollars worth of it coming into this UFA period.

Scott Gomez also has one of the most salary cap favorable contracts in terms of payment. Gomez is owed $33.5 million in cash over the next 5 seasons - that's an average of 6.7 million, on a 7.327 cap hit. Even better for the Habs is the fact that Gomez is only owed 9 million cash spread over the final two seasons of the deal - it would not surprise us at all if Gomez were included in a trade for Vincent Lecavalier in the next 2 or 3 years, or even in the near future.

From the Rangers' perspective, they dispose of a dirty contract, pick up an asset in Higgins, and scrounge up two other assets in McDonagh and Valentenko. The Rangers cleared off salary cap room which they immediately gave to Marian Gaborik - Gaborik lacks the durability of Gomez, but he is the elite-level scorer that the Rangers have lacked since Jaromir Jagr departed. Unfortunately, they are now lacking at center and do not possess the money to remedy that.

Final Thought

Montreal made a very creative deal to get a valuable contract and an asset that simply was not on the market. They likely overpaid for the privilege, however - it is hard to imagine that Glen Sather insisted on McDonagh being in the deal. Scott Gomez tends to be a player who looks better than his results - a few times a season his end-to-end rushes will result in thrilling goals, but they also result in blueline turnovers leading to goals the other way.

Saturday, July 4, 2009

The Chris Pronger Trade - Great Deal, Or The Greatest Deal?

Terms

To Philadelphia:

D Chris Pronger
LW Ryan Dingle

To Anaheim:

RW Joffrey Lupul
D Luca Sbisa
1st round pick in 2009 (21st overall)
1st round pick in 2010


Philadelphia's Take


D Chris Pronger

Age
: 34 (35 in October)
Contract Status: Signed Through 2009-10
Cap Hit: $6.25M
Durability: Medium
Time On Ice: Very High (26:56, 2nd in NHL)
Offensive Ability: High (11 goals, 48 points, 14th in NHL)
Defensive Ability: Medium (Avg QualComp, Avg QualTeam, Avg Corsi Number)
Discipline: Low (39 Minors, 8th in NHL)
Physicality: Medium (78 Hits, 92nd in NHL)

Pronger's low number of hits was surprising, but it appears Anaheim may have been severely undercounted in that department, as their top player was 78th in the league.

LW Ryan Dingle

Summary: Dingle is an organizational player - he is 25 and just completed his first full season in the AHL.

Anaheim's Take


RW Joffrey Lupul

Age
: 25 (26 in September)
Contract Status: Signed Through 2012-13
Cap Hit: $4.25MM
Expected Goals: 25
Discipline: Medium
Physicality: Medium

Lupul's contract compares favorably with Brian Gionta, his closest comparable on the open market this off-season. Lupul has had a strange up-and-down career; his SOG and TOI fluctuate quite wildly for a young player. If he can settle in around 3.3 SOG and a 10.5 shooting percentage, he could flirt with 30 goals most seasons.

Philadelphia had to get rid of this contract, as it was the least valuable in their eyes: youngster Claude Giroux should be able to fill in most of this production for around a 6th of the price.

The problem for Anaheim is that they have 3 legitimate top six RWs and only one LW - either Lupul or Selanne will have to convert to LW, or the team will be going particularly heavy on RWs.

D Luca Sbisa

Age
: 19
Contract Status: RFA, Signed through 2010-11
Cap Hit: $875K

Rather than yammer on about stats, let us simply talk about the fact that Sbisa played 38 games for a playoff team as an 18 year old. There are very few players who've done this in the last 15 years and did not at least become NHL regulars - Steve Eminger is one, David Tanabe another, but both promotions were likely the result of poor management. Sbisa's junior statistics suggest a player who is very capable at the offensive and defensive end - an unremarkable but solid defenseman in the Teppo Numminen mold (albeit with more penalties). Sbisa may not play on Anaheim this year, but he is controlled for at least 6 more seasons, making him an enormous addition to an Anaheim team whose prospects are somewhat weak.

2 1st Round Picks: The Ducks traded the 1st pick they received down and selected C/RW Kyle Palmieri and D Matthew Clark with what they received. The Flyers' pick will likely be 24th or lower next season - it is hard to gauge the strength of a draft a year before, but most reports are that it will not be as strong as this year's.

Summary

There are no 'winners' or 'losers' in trades, not in a salary capped league. We can safely say that Anaheim received more than would have been expected. Let's just go over pros and cons for both teams:

Philadelphia Pro: Receive one of the best defensemen in the league for only one asset off their roster, one which they were likely trading anyway. Receive a player whose contract is expiring at the end of the season; Philadelphia has 45.6 million dollars committed to next year's team, with Lupul's deal that's almost 50 million; if the salary cap were set at between 50 and 53 million in 2010-11, the team would be in serious cap trouble. Therefore, Pronger's contract only being for one year is an asset to the Philadelphia organization, and gives them an excellent chance to make a Stanley Cup run.

Philadelphia Con: Trade their best D prospect in Sbisa and give up 2 years worth of 1sts. Philadelphia has some very strong prospects in the minors, but unless Philly drafts particularly well in the later rounds in the next two seasons, that depth is likely to slacken.

Anaheim Pro: Receive an excellent D prospect, a valuable (to them) RW, and a lot of depth and trading chips for the future, for one player who was likely walking at the end of next season regardless. Anaheim now has a ton of assets with which to play around and a lot of salary cap room - suspicion is they won't use it this season, but if the franchise becomes solvent again, it certainly can.

Anaheim Con: Give up legitimate chance at Stanley Cup this season in order to rebuild. 26 minutes a game on defense just got traded, and Anaheim's depth at that position is not particularly strong or NHL-ready at this point.

Conclusion

In all, both sides did a good job getting what they needed out of the other.

Thursday, July 2, 2009

The Non-Tendered - Discarded Players Can Be An Inexpensive Source of Cheese

As a little refresher on NHL capology and contractology - restricted free agents' rights are retained by extending them a qualifying offer. A qualifying offer (or QO hereafter) must be a 10% raise on the previous contract if that contract is below the NHL average. As a result of the bad economy and salary cap ceiling, teams are choosing now not to give a QO to players who fail to live up to expectations, choosing instead to look elsewhere. Many of them also have handshake agreements to re-sign with their previous team, as Andy Greene, Erik Christensen, and Chris Thorburn have already done. But let's look at the best of the best unqualified players - these players may be coming off the scrapheap to help your team:

Steve Eminger, D - Steve Eminger was inexplicably promoted into the NHL by the Washington Capitals in 2002 as an 18 year old. From there, he languished in Washington, never quite living up to the promise of a player promoted to the NHL as a teenager. Eminger was traded 3 times last season, but his numbers are not terrible - his GA/60M are certainly good for a terrible team like Tampa, where he spent most of his time (averaging 23 minutes a game). Florida has to be interested in retaining Eminger, but teams in need of defense could and have been doing far worse than Eminger.

Brendan Bell, D - Plucked from the Leafs, Bell scored 6 goals in 53 games for the Senators, including 5 power play goals. He will be UFA next year, but Bell has some minor upside as a PP QB. Again, teams can and will do worse.

Jeremy Williams, RW - Williams scored 27 goals in 46 games in the AHL this past season. The knock on him is that he is small and slow, but he certainly has a scoring touch. Some teams insist on spending money on veteran scorers - Williams could provide 15 goals for very cheap.

Joakim Lindstrom, C - Lindstrom had 20 points in 44 games for the Coyotes averaging 15 minutes per game - this after being a point-a-game player in the AHL. One never knows when they will find the next Rich Peverley - he could be a good pickup for a team like Nashville looking to save some $.

Jeff Woywitka, D - Woywitka arrived in St. Louis in the Pronger deal and never quite established himself. He's been a +12 player in the last 3 years, with decent offensive numbers as well - 29 assists in 152 NHL games. With how much money depth defenders are signing for, around $1 million for a gamble on Jeff Woywitka could be a prudent move.

Dan Fritsche RW/C - Fritsche was traded twice last year and never really established himself on either squad. He is still only 23 years old, and while he likely doesn't have any upside as a 2nd line player, he scored 12 goals in 59 games as a 21 year old.

Non-tendered players aren't likely to put a team over the hump for the playoffs or a Stanley Cup - most of them have obvious flaws and there's a reason why they weren't given a QO. They can, however, offer better solutions to some problems than normal UFAs, and teams should be a little more willing to gamble on something that isn't a sure thing.